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Abstract
According to Jeffreys improper priors are needed to get the Bayesian
machine up and running. This may be disputed, but usage of improper
priors flourish. Arguments based on symmetry or information theo-
retic reference analysis can be most convincing in concrete cases. The
foundations of statistics as usually formulated rely on the axioms of
a probability space, or alternative information theoretic axioms that
imply the axioms of a probability space. These axioms do not include
improper laws, but this is typically ignored in papers that consider
improper priors.
The purpose of this paper is to present a mathematical theory
that can be used as a foundation for statistics that include improper
priors. This theory includes improper laws in the initial axioms and
has in particular Bayes theorem as a consequence. Another conse-
quence is that some of the usual calculation rules are modified. This
is important in relation to common statistical practice which usually
include improper priors, but tends to use unaltered calculation rules.
In some cases the results are valid, but in other cases inconsistencies
may appear. The famous marginalization paradoxes exemplify this
latter case.
An alternative mathematical theory for the foundations of statis-
tics can be formulated in terms of conditional probability spaces. In
this case the appearance of improper laws is a consequence of the the-
ory. It is proved here that the resulting mathematical structures for
the two theories are equivalent. The conclusion is that the choice of
the first or the second formulation for the initial axioms can be con-
sidered a matter of personal preference. Readers that initially have
concerns regarding improper priors can possibly be more open toward
a formulation of the initial axioms in terms of conditional probabilities.
The interpretation of an improper law is given by the corresponding
conditional probabilities.
Keywords: Axioms of statistics, Conditional probability space, Improper
prior, Projective space
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1 Introduction
Statistical developments are driven by applications, theory, and most im-
portantly the interplay between applications and theory. The following is
intended for readers that can appreciate the importance of the theoretical
foundation for probability theory as given by the axioms of Kolmogorov
[1933]. According to the recipe of Kolmogorov a random element in a set ΩX
is identified with a measurable function X : Ω→ ΩX where (Ω, E ,P) is the
basic probability space that the whole theory is based upon.
The use of improper priors is common in the statistical literature, but
most often without reference to a corresponding theoretical foundation. It
will here be explained how the theory of conditional probability spaces as
developed by Renyi [1970a] is related to a theory for statistics that includes
improper priors. This theory has been presented in a simplified form with
some elementary examples by Taraldsen and Lindqvist [2010]. The idea is
to use the above recipe given by Kolmogorov, but generalized by assuming
that (Ω, E ,P) is defined by the use of a σ-finite measure. The underlying
law P itself is not a σ-finite measure, but it is an equivalence class of σ-finite
measures. A more precise formulation is given by Definition 2 below.
In oral presentations of the theory related to improper priors it is quite
common that someone in the audience makes the following claim: Improper
priors are just limits of proper priors, so we need not consider improper
priors. We strongly disagree with this even though it is true that improper
priors can be obtained as limits of proper priors. The reason is perhaps
best explained by analogy with a more familiar example: It is true that
the real number system is obtained as a limit of the rational numbers. A
precise construction, and this is important, is found by the aid of equivalence
classes of Cauchy sequences. Nonetheless, most people prefer to think of real
numbers as such without reference to rational numbers. Real numbers are
just limits of rational numbers, but we use them with properties as given by
the axioms of the real number system.
The reader will not find any new algorithms or methods for the solu-
tion of practical problems here. The presented theory can, however, be used
to put many known solutions to practical problems on a more solid theo-
retical foundation. This additional effort is necessary to avoid and explain
contra-dictionary results as exemplified by for instance the famous marginal-
ization paradoxes [Stone and Dawid, 1972, Dawid et al., 1973]. The theory
also gives a natural frame for the proof of optimality of inference based
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on fiducial theory [Taraldsen and Lindqvist, 2013a] and a proof of coinci-
dence of a fiducial distribution and certain Bayesian posteriors based on
improper priors [Taraldsen and Lindqvist, 2013b]. The theory has also been
used for a rigorous specification of intrinsic conditional autoregression models
[Lavine and Hodges, 2012]. These models are widely used in spatial statis-
tics, dynamic linear models, and elsewhere.
2 Conditional measures
The aim in the following is to formulate a theory that can be used to provide
a foundation for statistics that includes improper priors. A less technical pre-
sentation of this with some elementary examples has already been provided
by Taraldsen and Lindqvist [2010]. They show in particular by examples
that this theory is different from the alternative theory for improper priors
provided by Hartigan [1983]. This section gives a condensed presentation of
the mathematical ingredients. Most definitions are standard as presented by
for instance Rudin [1987], but some are not standard and are emphasized in
the text. An example is the concept of a C-measure as introduced below.
Let X be a nonempty set, and F a family of subsets that includes the
empty set ∅. The family F is a σ-field if it is closed under formation of
countable unions and complements. A set is measurable if it belongs to F .
A measurable space X is a set X equipped with a σ-field F . The same
symbol X is here used to denote both the set and the space. The notation
(X ,F) is also used to denote the measurable space. The convention here is
to use the term space to denote a set with some additional structure.
A measure space (X ,F , µ) is a measurable space (X ,F) equipped with a
measure µ. A measure is a function µ : F → [0,∞] that is countably additive:
The equality µ(
⋃
iAi) =
∑
i µ(Ai) holds for disjoint measurable A1, A2, . . ..
Definition 1. Let (X ,F , µ) be a measure space. An admissible condition A
is a measurable set with 0 < µA <∞.
The measure space (X ,F , µ) is σ-finite if there exists a sequence A1, A2, . . .
of admissible conditions such that X = ∪iAi. A probability space is a mea-
sure space (X ,F , µ) such that µ(X ) = 1, and µ is then said to be a probability
measure.
Consider the set M of all σ-finite measures on a fixed measurable space
(X ,F). The set M includes in particular all probability measures, and the
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following gives new concepts also when restricted to probability measures.
Two elements µ and ν in M are defined to be equivalent if µ = αν for
some positive number α. This defines an equivalence relation ∼ and the
quotient spaceM/ ∼ defines the set of C-measures. It should in particular be
observed that any topology on M induces a corresponding quotient topology
onM/ ∼. Convergence of C-measures is an important topic, but the study of
this is left for the future. Some further discussion will, however, be provided
in Section 4. A C-measure space (X ,F , γ) is a measurable space (X ,F)
equipped with a C-measure γ. This means that γ = [µ] = {ν | ν ∼ µ} is an
equivalence class of σ-finite measures. The term conditional probability space
will here be used as an equivalent term. This convention will be motivated
next, and is further elaborated in Section 4.
Let (X ,F , γ) be a conditional probability space, and let A be an admissi-
ble condition. The conditional law, or equivalently the conditional measure,
γ(· |A) is then well defined by γ(B |A) = ν(B |A) = ν(B ∩ A)/ν(A) where
ν ∈ γ. It is well defined since it does not depend on the choice of ν, and the
resulting conditional law is a probability measure. This argument gives:
Proposition 1. A conditional probability space (X ,F , γ) defines a unique
family of probability spaces indexed by the admissible sets: {(X ,F , γ(· |A)) |A is admissible}.
For ease of reference we restate the following definition.
Definition 2. Let (X ,F) be a measurable space. A conditional measure
γ = [ν] = {αν | 0 < α < ∞, ν is σ-finite} is a set of σ-finite measures
defined by a σ-finite measure ν defined on (X ,F). Let A be an admissible
condition and let B be measurable. The formula γ(B |A) = ν(B ∩ A)/ν(A)
defines the conditional probability of B given A. A conditional measure space
(X ,F , γ) is a measurable space (X ,F) equipped with a conditional measure
γ.
In general probability and statistics it is most useful to extend the defi-
nition of conditional probability and expectation to include conditioning on
σ-fields and statistics. This can be done also in the more general context
here. The main new ingredient is given by the definition of σ-finite σ-fields
and σ-finite measurable functions.
Let (X ,F , µ) be a measure space. Assume that F1 ⊂ F is a σ-finite σ-
field in the sense that (X ,F1, µ1) is σ-finite where µ1 is the restriction of µ to
F1. This implies that (X ,F , µ) is also σ-finite. Let A ∈ F . The conditional
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measure µ(· | F1) is defined by the F1 measurable function x 7→ µ(A | F1)(x)
uniquely determined by the relation
µ(A ∩ B) =
∫
B
µ(A | F1)(x)µ1(dx) (1)
which is required to hold for all measurable subsets B ∈ F1.
The existence and uniqueness proof follows by observing: (i) νB = µ(AB)
defines a measure on F1. (ii) ν is dominated by the measure µ1. (iii)
The Radon-Nikodym theorem gives existence and uniqueness of the con-
ditional µ(A | F1) as the density of ν with respect to µ1 so the claim ν(dx) =
µ(A | F1)(x)µ1(dx) follows. The uniqueness is only as a measurable function
defined on the measure space (X ,F1, µ1) and the conditional probability is
more properly identified with an equivalence class of measurable functions.
The defining equation (1) shows that µ(A | F1) = (αµ)(A | F1) for all α >
0. It can be concluded that the conditional measure γ(A | F1) is well defined
if (X ,F , γ) is a conditional probability space. An immediate consequence
is γ(X | F1) = 1, so the conditional measures are all normalized. The term
conditional probability will motivated by this be used as equivalent to the
term conditional measure. This is as above for the elementary conditional
measure.
The following example demonstrates that this conditional probability gen-
eralizes the elementary conditional probabilities γ(A |B). Let F1 be the σ-
field generated by a countable partition of X into disjoint admissible sets
A1, A2, . . .. It follows that F1 is σ-finite. Assuming this the conditional
expectation is given by γ(A | F1)(x) = γ(A |Ai) for x ∈ Ai.
The definitions presented so far lead naturally to the definition of the cat-
egory of conditional probability spaces with a corresponding class of arrows.
The study of this, and functors to related categories, will not be pursued
here. This more general theory gives, however, alternative motivation for
some of the concepts presented next.
A function φ : X →Y is measurable if the inverse image of every mea-
surable set is measurable: (φ ∈ A) = φ−1(A) = {x |φ(x) ∈ A} is measurable
for all measurable A. Let µ be a measure on X . The image measure µφ is
defined by
µφ(A) = µ(φ ∈ A) (2)
A measurable function φ is by definition σ-finite if µφ is σ-finite. A direct
verification shows that a σ-finite function φ : X →Y pushes a conditional
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probability space structure on X into a conditional probability space struc-
ture on Y . This follows from the above and the identity [µ]φ = [µφ]. Con-
sequently, if γ is a C-measure, then the C-measure γφ is well defined if φ is
σ-finite. The definition given here of a σ-finite function is a generalization of
the concept of a regular random variable as defined by Renyi [1970a, p.73].
The definition of σ-finite σ-fields and σ-finite measurable functions can be
reformulated as follows.
Definition 3. Let (X ,F , µ) be a σ-finite measure space. A σ-field F1 ⊂ F is
σ-finite if µ restricted to F1 is σ-finite. Let (Y ,G) be a measurable space. A
measurable φ : X →Y is σ-finite if the σ-field F1 = {{x |φ(x) ∈ A} |A ∈ G}
is σ-finite.
The previous arguments show that the σ-finite functions can play the
role as arrows in the category of conditional probability spaces. The σ-
finite functions can also be used to define conditional probabilities just as
σ-finite σ-fields did in equation (1). It will be a generalization since the
previous definition is obtained by consideration of the function x 7→ x as a
function taking values in the space equipped with the σ-finite σ-field in the
construction that follows.
Assume that δ : X →Z is σ-finite. The conditional probability µz(A) =
µ(A | δ = z) is defined by the relation
µ(A[δ ∈ B]) =
∫
µ(A | δ = z)[z ∈ B]µδ(dz) (3)
which is required to hold for all measurable subsets B ⊂ Z. The existence
and uniqueness proof follows by an argument similar to the argument after
equation (1). The identity [µ]z = µz holds and the conditional measure γz is
well defined for a C-measure γ.
Composition of the functions x 7→ δ(x) = z and z 7→ µz(A) defines the
conditional probability µ(A | δ) as a measurable function defined on X . This
function is measurable with respect to the initial σ-field Fδ ⊂ F generated
by δ. The σ-finiteness of δ is equivalent with the σ-finiteness of Fδ. Direct
verification shows that the definitions of conditional probability given by
equations (1) and (3) coincide in the sense that µ(A | Fδ) = µ(A | δ).
The conclusion is that a conditional probability space (X ,F , γ) is not only
equipped with the family of elementary conditional probabilities {γ(· |A) |A ∈
A}, but also a family {γz | z ∈ Z} of conditional probabilities for each σ-finite
δ : X →Z.
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The conditional probability µzφ on Y is defined by
µzφ(A) = µ
z(φ ∈ A) = µ(φ ∈ A | δ = z) (4)
The function δ must be σ-finite, but it is not required that φ : X →Y is
σ-finite. It follows that
µφ,δ(dy, dz) = µ
z
φ(dy)µδ(dz) (5)
The case X = Y and φ(x) = x gives the defining equation (3) as a special
case of the more general factorization given by equation (5).
The previous discussion can be summarized by:
Proposition 2. A conditional measure space (X ,F , γ), a σ-finite δ : X →Z,
and a measurable φ : X →Y define a unique measurable family {γzφ | z ∈ Z}
of conditional measures defined on Y.
It does not follow in general that there exists a version of γzφ such that
this is a measure for almost all z. A sufficient condition for this is that Y
is a Borel space [Schervish, 1995, p.618]. This is the case if Y is in one-
one measurable correspondence with a measurable subset of an uncountable
complete separable metric space [Royden, 1989, p.406]. The corresponding
version of the conditional probability is then said to be a regular conditional
probability. Integration with respect to γzφ can nonetheless be defined without
any regularity conditions, and the factorization given by equation (5) holds
in the most general case as stated. The possibility of this more general
integral with respect to conditional probabilities was indicated already by
Kolmogorov [1933, eq.10 on p.54].
3 Statistics with Improper Priors
Let x be the observed result of an experiment. It will be assumed that
x can be identified with an element of a mathematically well defined set
ΩX . The set should include all other possible outcomes that could have been
observed as a result of the experiment. The observed result can be a number,
a collection of numbers organized in some way, a continuous function, a
self-adjoint linear operator, a closed subset of a topological space, or any
other element of a well defined set corresponding to the experiment under
consideration.
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Assume that the sample space ΩX is equipped with a σ-field EX so that
(ΩX , EX) is a measurable space. Assume furthermore that (ΩX , EX,P
θ
X) is a
probability space for each θ in the model parameter space ΩΘ. The family
{PθX | θ ∈ ΩΘ} specifies a statistical model for the experiment.
A predominant family of example in the applied statistical literature is
given by letting PθX be the multivariate Gaussian distribution on ΩX = R
N
with covariance matrix Σ(θ) and mean µ(θ) where ΩΘ ⊂ R
K . The sim-
plest special case is given by Σ = I and µ = (θ; . . . ; θ) which corresponds
to independent sampling from the univariate Gaussian with unknown mean
θ and variance equal to 1. Other examples included are given by ANOVA
models with fixed and random effects, more general regression models, struc-
tured equations models with latent variables from the fields of psychology
and economy [Jo¨reskog, 1970], and a variety of models from the statistical
signal processing literature [Van Trees, 2002]. These models correspond to
specific choices of the functional dependence on θ in Σ(θ) and µ(θ).
The contents so far coincides with the definition of a statistical model as
found in standard statistical literature. One exception is the choice of the
notation {PθX | θ ∈ ΩΘ} for the statistical model. This choice indicates the
connection to the theory of conditional probability spaces as will be explained
by the introduction of further assumptions.
It is assumed that the statistical model is based upon an underlying
abstract conditional probability space (Ω, E ,P). This includes the case of an
underlying abstract probability space as formulated by Kolmogorov [1933]
as a special case, but seen as a conditional probability space. It is abstract
in the sense that it is assumed to exist, but it is not specified. It is assumed
that the model parameter space is a measurable space (ΩΘ, EΘ), that there
exists a σ-finite measurable Θ : Ω→ ΩΘ, and that there exists a measurable
X : Ω→ ΩX so that the resulting conditional probability P
θ
X as defined in
equation (4) coincides with the specified statistical model.
Existence of Ω, P, Θ, and X can be proved in many concrete cases by
consideration of the product space ΩX ×ΩΘ equipped with the σ-finite mea-
sure PθX(dx)pi(dθ) obtained from the choice of a σ-finite measure pi. This
includes in particular the multivariate Gaussian example indicated above.
As soon as existence is established it is assumed for the further theoretical
development that Ω, P, Θ, and X are abstract unspecified objects with the
required resulting statistical model as a consequence.
It can be observed that it is required that the mapping θ 7→ PθX(A) is
measurable for all measurable A for the above construction to be possible.
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This condition is trivially satisfied in most examples found in applications,
and is furthermore a typical assumption in theoretical developments. A good
example of the latter is given by the mathematical proof of the factorization
theorem for sufficient statistics [Halmos and Savage, 1949].
The basis for frequentist inference is then the observation x and the spec-
ified statistical model PθX based on the underlying abstract conditional prob-
ability space (Ω, E ,P).
The basis for Bayesian inference is as for frequentist inference, but the
prior distribution PΘ is also specified. The basis for Bayesian inference is
hence the observation x and the joint distribution PX,Θ(dx, dθ) = P
θ
X(dx) PΘ(dθ).
The conclusions of Bayesian inference are derived from the posterior distribu-
tion PxΘ, which is well defined by equation (4) if X is σ-finite. This result can
be considered to be a very general version of Bayes theorem as promised in
the Abstract. A discussion of a more elementary version involving densities
is given by Taraldsen and Lindqvist [2010].
The importance of the σ-finiteness of X has also been observed by others,
but then as a requirement on the prior. Berger et al. [2009, p.911] includes
this requirement as a part of the definition of a permissible prior. The def-
inition as formulated in this section can be used as a generalization of this
part to cases not defined by densities.
A summary of the contents in this section is given by:
Definition 4 (Statistical model). A statistical model {(ΩX , EX ,P
θ
X) | θ ∈
ΩΘ} is specified by a family of probability spaces indexed by the model param-
eter space (ΩΘ, EΘ) with the additional structure defined in the following.
It is assumed that all objects are defined based on the underlying condi-
tional probability space (Ω, E ,P). The observation is given by a measurable
function X : Ω→ ΩX and the model parameter is given by a σ-finite mea-
surable function Θ : Ω→ ΩΘ. It is assumed that the family of probability
measures is given by the conditional law, so PθX(A) = P(X ∈ A |Θ = θ).
A Bayesian statistical model is specified by a statistical model together
with a specification of the prior law PΘ. It is assumed that X is σ-finite, and
then the resulting marginal law PX is a conditional measure and the resulting
posterior law PxΘ(B) = P(Θ ∈ B |X = x) is well defined.
In the previous the prior PΘ, the marginal PX , and the joint distribu-
tion PX,Θ are C-measures with corresponding conditional probability spaces
(ΩΘ, EΘ,PΘ), (ΩX , EX,PX), and (ΩX,Θ, EX,Θ,PX,Θ). The interpretation of the
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prior is in terms of the corresponding elementary conditional laws PΘ(· |A).
The same holds for the other improper laws.
Bayesian inference is essentially unique. This is in contrast to frequentist
inference which most often offer many different possible inference procedures
for a given problem. An analogous situation occurs in applied metrology
where it is common to have many different measurement instruments avail-
able for the measurement of a physical quantity. The choice of instrument
depends on the actual situation and purpose of the experiment at hand.
The previous gives a mathematical definition of a statistical model and
a Bayesian statistical model based on the concept of a conditional measure.
The concept of a fiducial statistical model can also be defined based on the
same theory. The necessary ingredients and further discussion of this have
been presented by Taraldsen and Lindqvist [2013a,b].
4 Renyi Conditional Probability Spaces
Renyi [1970a, p.38-] gives a definition of a conditional probability space based
on a family of objects µ(A |B). A condensed summary of the initial ingre-
dients in this theory is presented next, but with some extensions and minor
changes in the choice naming conventions. The purpose is to show the close
connection to the concept of a conditional measure space as discussed in the
previous two section. The final words of Renyi on this subject are recom-
mended for a more thorough [Renyi, 1970a] and pedagogical presentation
[Renyi, 1970b] of the theory as formulated and motivated by Renyi.
Definition 5 (Bunch). Let (X ,F) be a measurable space. A family B ⊂ F
is a bunch in X if
1. B1, B2 ∈ B ⇒ B1 ∪ B2 ∈ B.
2. There exist B1, B2, . . . ∈ B such that
⋃
iBi = X .
3. The empty set ∅ does not belong to B.
Example 1 Let (X ,F) be the real line equipped with the Borel σ-field.
Let B be the set of finite nonempty unions of open intervals on the form
(m/2, 1 + m/2) where m are integers. The family B is then a countable
bunch. ✷
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Definition 6 (Renyi space). A Renyi space (X ,F , ν) is a measurable space
(X ,F) equipped with a family {ν(· |B) |B ∈ B} of probability measures in-
dexed by a bunch B which fulfill B1, B2 ∈ B and B1 ⊂ B2 ⇒ ν(B1 |B2) > 0,
and the identity
ν(A |B1) =
ν(A ∩B1 |B2)
ν(B1 |B2)
(6)
A Renyi space (X ,F , ν2) extends a Renyi space (X ,F , ν1) by definition
if B1 ⊂ B2 and ν1(· |B) = ν2(· |B) for all B ∈ B1. The extension is strict if
B1 ⊂ B2 and B1 6= B2. A Renyi space is maximal if a strict extension does
not exist.
Example 1 (continued) Let ν(A |B) be the uniform probability law on
B for each B ∈ B. This gives a Renyi space (X ,F , ν) where (X ,F) is the
real line with the Borel σ-field. The family {ν(· |B)}B∈B is in this case a
countable family of probability measures.
Let µ = [m] be the C-measure given by Lebesgue measure m on the real
line. The elementary conditional measures µ(· |A) for admissible A ∈ A
defines a Renyi space (X ,F , µ) which contains the Renyi space (X ,F , ν) in
the sense that B ⊂ A and ν(· |B) = µ(· |B) for all B ∈ B. It follows from
the results presented next that (X ,F , µ) is a maximal extension of (X ,F , ν).
✷
It follows generally that a C-measure space (X ,F , µ) generates a unique
Renyi space (X ,F , µ) through the elementary conditional measures µ(· |A).
The same symbol µ is here used for two different concepts. Further excuse
for this abuse of notation is given by the following structure result:
Proposition 3. A Renyi space generates a unique conditional measure space.
The corresponding resulting Renyi space is a maximal extension of the initial
Renyi space.
Proof. Let (X ,F , ν) be the Renyi space. It will be proved that there exists
a σ-finite measure µ such that µ(· |B) = ν(· |B) for all B ∈ B, and that the
C-measure [µ] is unique.
The first step in the proof is to pick an arbitrary B0 ∈ B and define
µ(B) = ν(B |B0 ∪ B)/ν(B0 |B0 ∪ B) for B ∈ B. This choice gives the
normalization µ(B0) = 1. This definition is extended to measurable A ⊂
B ∈ B by µ(A) = µ(A ∩ B) = ν(A |B)µ(B). An arbitrary measurable A
can be written as a disjoint union of measurable A1, A2, . . . where each Ai
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is contained in some set B from the bunch. The measure µ is then finally
defined by µ(A) =
∑
i µ(Ai).
Equation (6) can be used to prove that the previous definition of µ(A)
based on a A ⊂ B for B ∈ B does not depend on the choice of B. This, and
further proof of consistency and uniqueness of [µ] is left to the reader. An
alternative is to consult the proof of a corresponding result given by Renyi
[1970a, p.40-43].
Two different Renyi spaces can generate the same C-measure space. A
concrete example is provided by consideration of the bunch generated by
the intervals (m/3, m/3 + 1) in addition to the two bunches considered in
Example 1. It follows generally that the set of Renyi spaces based on a
given measurable space is strictly larger than the set of C-measures on the
measurable space.
Corollary 1. A Renyi space has a unique extension to a maximal Renyi
space. The set of maximal Renyi spaces is in one-one correspondence with
the set of C-measure spaces.
Proof. Let (X ,F , ν) be a Renyi space and let (X ,F , [µ]) be the corresponding
generated C-measure space. The Renyi space (X ,F , [µ]) given by the set of
admissible conditions A is then a unique maximal extension. Uniqueness
and maximality follows since any Renyi space that contains (X ,F , ν) will
generate the C-measure space (X ,F , [µ]) by the construction given in the
proof of Proposition 3.
A more general concept of a conditional probability space was originally
introduced by Renyi [1955], and a corresponding more general structure the-
orem was proved by Csa´sza´r [1955]. Renyi [1970a, p.95] refers to these more
general spaces as generalized conditional probability spaces. They are truly
more general and a generalized conditional probability space is not necessar-
ily generated by a single σ-finite measure.
5 Discussion
The distinction between a σ-finite measure space and the corresponding C-
measure space could at first sight seem trivial. For a σ-finite measure µ the
corresponding C-measure ν = [µ] is an equivalence class of σ-finite measures
in the set of all σ-finite measures on the measurable space X . It follows,
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as stated earlier, that any topology on the set of σ-finite measures gives a
corresponding quotient topology on the set of C-measures. Convergence of σ-
finite measures is different from convergence of the corresponding conditional
measures. This is also true if the initial σ-finite measure is a probability
measure.
An alternative is to consider the C-measure space as a maximal Renyi
space, and this is a concept more clearly distinct from that of a σ-finite mea-
sure space. Convergence concepts for Renyi spaces can be studied directly,
and initial work on this has been done by Renyi [1970a]. He shows in partic-
ular that any conditional measure can be obtained as a limit of conditional
measures corresponding to probability measures in a reasonable topology.
The study of convergence concepts exemplify an important difference be-
tween σ-finite measures and C-measures. This is left for the future.
The distinction between a σ-finite measure space and the correspond-
ing C-measure space can also be seen by analogy with the construction of
projective spaces. The projective space Pn(R) as a set is the set of lines
through the origin 0 in Rn+1. It is hence equal to the set of equivalence
classes [x] = {λx |λ ∈ R \ {0}, x ∈ Rn+1 \ {0}} in Rn+1 \ {0}. The set of
C-measures on a measurable space is hence different from the set of σ-finite
measures just as a projective space is different from the space on which it is
constructed.
The presented theory is in line with the arguments given by Jeffreys
[1939]. He argues that improper priors are necessary to get the Bayesian
machine up and running. This point of view can be disputed, but it is
indisputable that usage of improper priors flourish in the statistical literature.
There is hence a need for a theory that includes improper priors.
Lindley [1965], apparently in line with the view of the current authors,
found that the theory of Renyi is a natural starting point for statistical theory.
In the Preface to his classical text on probability he writes:
The axiomatic structure used here is not the usual one associated
with the name of Kolmogorov. Instead one based on the ideas of
Renyi has been used. The essential difference between the two
approaches is that Renyi’s is stated in terms of conditional prob-
abilities, whereas Kolmogorov’s is in terms of absolute probabil-
ities, and conditional probabilities are defined in terms of them.
Our treatment always refers to the probability of A, given B, and
not simply to the probability of A. In my experience students
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benefit from having to think of probability as a function of two
arguments, A and B, right from the beginning. The condition-
ing event, B, is then not easily forgotten and misunderstandings
are avoided. These ideas are particularly important in Bayesian
inference where one’s views are influenced by the changes in the
conditioning event.
Lindley [1965] refers to an earlier German edition of the book cited here
[Renyi, 1962]. The two books [Renyi, 1970b,a] represent the final view of
Renyi regarding conditional probability spaces, but the basis for the the-
ory development are found in earlier articles [Renyi and Turan, 1976, Renyi,
1955]. The extension given by conditioning on σ-finite statistics and σ-finite
σ-fields is not treated by Renyi.
The structure theorem shows in general that a family of conditional prob-
abilities that satisfies the axioms of a Renyi space given in Definition 6 can be
extended so that it corresponds to a unique maximal Renyi space which can
be identified with a C-measure space. The family of conditional probabilities
gives intuitive motivation and interpretation for usage of improper laws in
probability and statistics. In this theory any marginal law corresponds to a
conditional probability space. All probabilities are conditional probabilities.
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